First introduced as a new protocol implemented in Chrome Canary for the Google Inc. Chrome browser, New Hope is engineered as a post-quantum key exchange for the TLS 1.2 protocol. The structure of the exchange is a combination of elliptic curve enhancements along with revised lattice-based cryptography.
Introduction
New Hope is a novel encryption scheme based on lattice cryptography and offers postquantum security within the key exchange. New Hope uses a Montgomery form to reduce cost of implementation in terms of computational speed. As a modification to elliptic curve cryptography New Hope instead reduces cost by sending an x-coordinate to compute the relative x-coordinate of any scalar [1] . Alkim, et al. implement a rounding function ⌊ ⌉ derived from the work of Peikert [2] to achieve equality with the floor function ⌊ + 1/2⌋. This floor function is an element of integers.
New Hope employs = 12289 and = 1024 as constraints of lattice 4, which results in a reduction of the modulus to = 12289 < 2 14 [1] . Peikert defines both the rounding and floor function of New Hope, using sub-Gaussian and zeta functions [2] . Peikert's "canonical embedding" necessarily incorporates a homomorphic injective ring that maps ( ) to ℂ which fixes pointwise ℚ [2] .
The critical nature of an unbiased modular operation presents key values which are assumed to mitigate cryptanalysis. Peikert recommends the use of small noise values to achieve this result while cautioning against cross-rounding given the determinacy that may result [2] . Any such determinacy negates an otherwise unbiased result. It is here that New Hope diverges from its basis on Peikert's work.
The creators of New Hope outline a sketch to create a backdoor based on the trapdoor functions of NTRU. The sketch outlined in New Hope is therefore a generalized example, rather than a proof of any such backdoor. Keeping in mind that the authors of New Hope have engineered a bare protocol aimed at mitigating passive attacks, we thus propose an active attack using the generalized form provided in [1] . Concerns of a backdoor capability extended to New Hope will now be addressed in detail, treating Alice and Bob as server and client, respectively, with malicious attacker, Oscar. We first begin with generalized parameters and functions associated with Alice.
Parameters
The parameter of ( ), fixed or otherwise, may potentially facilitate constructing a backdoor. The values of ( ) are a function of the initial setup with respect to the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Knowing the values of ( , ) within the range of (−2 * 16, 2 * 16) in terms of mod ≥ 4 * 16 + 1 is knowing them in ℤ.
The backdoor relies on the pseudo-inverse of a polynomial ( , ∈ ), * * ≡ mod for any polynomial ( ∈ ) such that (1) ≡ 0 mod . If the secret key equation can be modified to equal ≡ ℎ + mod , it is feasible to apply a pseudo-inversion. For a detailed analysis of inversion oracles refer to the primary source of Mol and Yung [3] . Through implementing the attack developed in [3] , it is possible to demonstrate a backdoor exists against New Hope. This occurs as an active attack by Oscar against Alice. We now turn to Alice's ring element ( = ′ + ′ ), and
Inversion
Given the new secret key equation derived from [3] , let the following hold. Let ( = − ), ( = ) for ≡ − * ℎ(mod ), and ( = -), ( = ) for ≡ ℎ + ℎ (mod ). In both cases, ( , ) are binary. An oracle will output the correct key pair only when ∈ ,ℎ [3] . To apply this inversion the anti-derivative of the Peikert scheme used by New Hope must be established. Per the authors of New Hope, the implementation of the key encapsulation method (KEM) relies on pseudorandom ring elements exchanged between Alice and Bob which are then used to derive the session key [1] . The reconciliation function is rec( , ) such that:
The authors of New Hope set as parameters of the polynomial ring ℛ = 
To satisfy the constraint of the variable ( ) as a member of ( ,ℎ ) and with the value of ( ) known, one can substitute for ( ) accordingly. Where ( ) corresponds to the Hamming weights to produce an inversion oracle against NTRU [3] , New Hope employs a weight value of exp ( is the ring of integer polynomials modulo + 1 where each coefficient is reduced modulo ( ).
Analysis
With the intersection Voronoi 24-cell treated as a convex polytope, the 16-cell ℓ 1 -ball is a simplicial polytope while the ℓ ∞ -ball together with the 16-cell are the only regular Euclidean 4-space tessellations. Given these parameters, the 24-cell constructed as a Voronoi tessellation having center at 4 for any point is expressed as:
If, for any = there is some point where (1) ≡ 0mod , the introduction of an inversion oracle is then verified.
Treating the lattice 2 as a binary field extension of the approximate x-coordinates, the binary field characteristic is thus two given the use of a Montgomery form for optimization of [1] . This characteristic of two implies that the binary field extension has order 2 for . Given = 12289 is Returning to mod , as derived, we may reduce the equation −2 = 0 with respect to modulo q. The inversion constraints of ( = − ) and ( = ) with respect to ≡ ℎ + mod( ), ( , ) are adjusted via substitutions of w for g, and v with − . We then return to the equivalent form of mod and derive:
To continue we replace − with − = − and then simply subtract u from each side, leaving − = − . By additive inverse, we then have = and may proceed as before. Using the pseudo-inverse polynomial ( , ) we proceed by using the expression mod congruent to * * .
Allowing the polynomial as an element of the ring , and deriving via substitution of = − as done for we may begin constructing the expression congruent to by adding and . 
Conclusion
With the values of ( , ) available to Oscar and leveraged against Alice, Oscar can maintain persistence within the network. New Hope largely avoids any issues this may cause by specifically using ephemeral , but does allow temporary caching of with respect to Alice should the costs of generating unique become too great [1] . Considering this, it should be stated that if Oscar's inversion succeeds, his ability to access Alice's cached hinges on knowing when caching occurs, and what value of is required. This continues to present a significant challenge.
The anti-derivative provided opens the possibility to manipulate the secret ( ) while simultaneously using the variable ( ) substituted for ( ) in addition to some constant. This constant added to the variables ( , ) based upon the traditionally fixed value of NTRU, though applied against New Hope facilitates an inversion of the scheme. The vectors of ( ) and relative approximate coordinates are shown equivalent to for known s. Under this model, Oscar can compromise the generation of ( , ), and use these values to introduce an arbitrary constant.
